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ABSTRACT 
This study is part of a collaborative project between the International Food Policy Research 
Institute and the Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait on public policy and poverty reduction in the Arab 
region.  The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of an increase in public spending in priority 
areas on economic growth and poverty reduction in Yemen.  To accomplish this objective, the study 
builds a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model to provide a baseline scenario of changes 
in the economy and poverty levels in Yemen during the period 1998-2016.  Alternative scenarios are 
then compared to isolate the specific impact of several policies on poverty.  The scenarios assume an 
increase in public spending devoted to three priority areas (agriculture, education, and health), which 
affect the economy through an increase in sectoral or economy-wide technical factor productivity.   
Results of public spending experiments show that targeting increased amounts of public 
spending towards education and health services will generate more economic growth and poverty 
reduction than increasing public spending solely on the agricultural sector.  However, when an oil 
sector is a prominent part of the economy, as in Yemen, additional public spending on health and 
education does not improve productivity in the oil sector.  Therefore, spending on agriculture 
becomes the most important channel for poverty reduction and economic growth.  
While increasing public spending in priority areas appears to be the best solution available for 
the government to reduce poverty during the next decade, the road is still long for Yemen to be able 
to achieve its Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction.  Re-allocating public 
expenditures from defense to key sectors appears to be an additional option for reducing poverty, 
given the financial constraints facing Yemen.  However, in the current context of terrorism concerns, 
it will be difficult to convince policy-makers to reduce spending on defense and security.  Seeking 
additional resources from international donors seems to be the only option available to increase 
benefits from increased public spending in the priority areas identified and assessed in this study.    1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of US$460 in 
2006.  To achieve sustainable employment-generating growth and to deliver the public services for 
achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of halving the number of poor by 2015, Yemen 
faces severe structural and policy constraints.  The country’s problems are compounded by high 
population growth (about three percent per year), which results in a disproportionate number of young 
people (half of the population is below age 15). 
Currently, the most important challenges for Yemen's economy are to accelerate growth and 
to reduce poverty.  Public spending is an important instrument for achieving such targets where the 
private contribution to economic activity is weak.  Public spending can indirectly help to develop the 
private sector and have a direct impact on the poor, through direct transfers to households and through 
public spending on social services and public investment.  Furthermore, improved budget 
management, public administration, governance, and transparency and accountability benefit the poor 
through more efficient and better targeted use of public resources (Ames et al., 2001). 
While consolidating public finances and rationalizing subsidies, Yemen expects to reach its 
MDG target by implementing a package of reforms outlined in its Five-Year Plan.  The Plan calls for 
improving the quality of education and making it universal, ensuring gender equality, reducing child 
mortality and malnutrition rates, improving the health indicators, ensuring sustained economic 
growth, and improving governance.  In other words, the government is required to do more with 
fewer resources.  For these reasons, it is important to evaluate the contribution of public spending to 
poverty reduction both directly and indirectly.  The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of 
different types of government spending to better target available resources to achieve rapid economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  This study is a part of a cooperative project between the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait (API) to improve 
understanding of how public policy including government spending can bring about poverty 
reduction in the context of the MDG. 
Empirical evidence has shown that investment in social services improves human capital and 
reduces poverty over the long run.  Good education and health care help the poor lead more 
productive lives, increasing the return on investments.  As growth is mostly driven by labor and total 
factor productivity (TFP), which includes human capital, any investment intended to improve the   2
productivity of labor and TFP will improve the sustainability of economic growth in a given country.  
A healthier and more productive labor force helps to stimulate development of the private sector.  
While theoretical and empirical studies confirm that public spending on education and basic 
health care is anti-poverty, few studies have assessed the effect of targeted public spending on 
poverty.  Moreover, none of these studies focuses on Arab countries.  At a time when most 
developing countries need to reduce subsidies and other public spending to decrease budget deficits, it 
is important to set priorities for poverty reduction, targeting public spending to specific sectors.  
Several legitimate questions do arise: How effective has public spending been? What seems to work 
better for poverty reduction?  Which types of spending are most likely to generate the highest rate of 
poverty reduction with minimum cost for the economy?  
It is widely admitted that gains in TFP, reflecting more efficient use of inputs, have long been 
recognized as an important source of improvement in income and welfare.  According to many recent 
studies, such as those conducted by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Easterly and Levine 
(2000), cross-country differences in income levels and growth rates are mostly due to differences in 
productivity.  Public spending on research and development (R&D), infrastructure, and human capital 
is believed to be one of the leading determinants of economic growth, mainly by improving TFP.   
An indirect way of assessing the effect of public spending on economic growth is to use TFP 
as a dependent variable and to regress other variables on it, mainly those related to public spending, 
assuming that targeted public spending will improve TFP.  Through improvement of TFP, the 
economy will grow faster.  Consequently, poverty will decline.  To do so, estimation of trends in TFP 
is required.  However, some issues related to the estimation and interpretations of TFP tend to make 
such an approach problematic, especially for a country where good data are missing. 
In general, public investment in R&D, in roads and other infrastructures, translates into future 
returns.  There is a tendency to underestimate the true value of the independent variable in public 
spending today.  According to the World Bank (2000a), estimation of TFP growth is very sensitive to 
the data used.  Estimation of TFP growth requires data on the growth rate of real GDP, physical 
capital, and labor input adjusted for human capital.  While real GDP growth rates are available from 
many sources, measuring growth rates of capital stock and human-capital-adjusted labor input is more 
difficult.  Measuring growth rates of capital stock is highly sensitive to assumptions regarding initial 
stocks and depreciation rates.  In addition, estimating human-capital-adjusted labor input is, in itself,   3
problematic (World Bank 2000a).  Accordingly, the estimation of TFP growth carried out by the 
World Bank is sensitive to the choice of the production function and to the degree of scale economies. 
Finally, the interpretation of estimates of TFP growth in itself matters, since TFP includes 
numerous specific sources of efficiency gains sources that can only be discovered with analysis of the 
TFP itself.  In light of the drawbacks to estimating TFP growth, one might consider another option: 
directly estimating the production function econometrically to avoid assumptions of constant returns 
and perfect competition by regressing output growth on input growth.  However, it is not possible to 
use that approach here because data are missing for Yemen.  
Therefore, rather than doing regressions, it is justifiable to use results on growth elasticities of 
public spending obtained from other studies, mainly through cross-country analysis.  Thus, the 
elasticities used in the empirical assessment of public spending on poverty in Yemen in this study 
come from empirical literature devoted to the determinants of economic growth at the aggregate level 
and for the agricultural sector.  They are not specific to Yemen.  Using these elasticities is appropriate 
if one believes that Yemen’s economy will adjust and respond to the same basic economic forces of 
health and education that have made human capital more productive in a cross section of many other 
countries (see for instance Barro, 1997; Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer, 1997).  
To assess the effect of public spending on poverty changes, the use of a comprehensive 
analytical tool – a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) - is needed.  This type of model has 
become a standard tool for the integrated assessment of public policies and income distribution for 
small economies.
1  Its main advantage lies in the possibility of combining detailed and consistent 
databases with a theoretically sound framework.  It is able to capture feedback effects and market 
interdependencies that may either mute or accentuate first-order effects. 
For this purpose, a dynamic CGE model is constructed to provide a baseline scenario for the 
economy and poverty changes in Yemen during the period 1998-2016, to which alternative policy 
scenarios may then be compared to isolate the specific impact the latter.  The alternative scenarios 
assume an increase in public spending devoted to a given sector, which will increase the TFP.  Such 
improvements in TFP will affect the whole economy, in general, and the poverty level, in particular.  
The CGE model is used to assess the detailed effects of the alternative scenarios related to public 
spending experiments.  Finally, the poverty elasticities with respect to real mean consumption per 
                                                 
1 See for instance Rutherford, Rustrom, and Tarr (1997) for Morocco, or Dessus and Suwa-Eisenman (1999) for 
Egypt and Tunisia.   4
capita are estimated and used to calculate the new poverty measures generated both in the baseline 
scenario and the public spending experiments.    5
2.  RECENT AND ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THE POVERTY PROFILE 
The Economy of Yemen  
Since unification, the government of Yemen has worked to integrate two relatively disparate 
economic systems.  However, severe shocks—including the return in 1990 of approximately 850,000 
Yemenis from the Gulf States, a subsequent major reduction of aid flows, and an increase in internal 
political disputes culminating in the 1994 Civil War ─ hampered economic growth.  As a result, 
economic growth has been lower than population growth, financial imbalances have increased, 
workers’ remittances have decreased substantially, the inflation rate has reached 71 percent, and 
external debt has mounted.  During 1992-94 the parallel market exchange rate depreciated, causing 
GNP per capita to decline substantially from US$701 in 1990 to US$318 in 1995 (World Bank 2002).  
When the war ended in 1995, the government entered into agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to institute a macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform.  The program included 
strong fiscal adjustment measures, liberalization of most interest rates and reform of the exchange rate 
system, including in 1996 the elimination of the official exchange rate and unification of exchange 
rates at the free market level and the adoption of a floating rate regime (IMF 2001).  The impact of 
these measures on the balance of payments has been favorable.  The current account recorded a 
surplus from 1996 to 2002 (with the exception of 1998) and the surplus peaked at about 14.2 percent 
of GDP in 2000, but dropped to 7.0 percent in 2001 and 5.4 percent in 2002.  Furthermore, inflation 
rates continued to decline and reached a single digit in 1997, reflecting success in reducing the fiscal 
deficit, which allowed for tight monetary growth (World Bank, 2002).  
Following a minor discovery of Oil in 1982 in the south, the share of oil and gas in the 
economy has increased from 13 percent of GDP in 1995 to 34 percent in 2000, while the share of 
agriculture dropped from 24 to 15 percent during the same period.  Oil dependency is even more 
pronounced in public finances with oil and gas accounting for almost 90 percent of total government 
revenues, creating a boom-bust cycle in public finances, affecting the government’s ability to finance 
essential services and investments.  
Overall, despite severe shocks during the first half of the 1990s, GDP growth was particularly 
high relative to regional standards during the 1990s.  During the pre-reform period (1991-94), real 
GDP growth averaged 4.1 percent, mainly due to high growth in the oil sector and government 
services.  During the reform period and after (1995-2002), economic growth averaged 5.4 percent per 
year, driven mainly by the increase in agriculture value-added and the service sectors.  Since the   6
majority of the poor work in services or in the agriculture sector, it is probable that the economic 
performance during the post-reform period has positively affected the incidence of poverty.  The 
patterns of growth in the two periods are significantly different.  During the first period (1991-94), the 
growth rate was up in only one year (1992), whereas growth was more sustained at the second period 
with relatively moderate rates  (see the Appendix, Table 1A).  In-depth analysis shows that different 
forces contributed to these growth rates.  A closer look at the economic sectors is required to explain 
them.  Agriculture remains the most important sector in the economy of Yemen.  During the period 
1990-2002, it accounted for about 19 percent of GDP and a more than 50 share of total employment.  
However, reliance on irrigation in a country with scarce water resources, prevalence of traditional 
methods of cultivation, and the cultivation of qat
2, has reduced the share of agriculture in the 
country's GDP during the last 13 years, which declined from 24 percent in 1990 to about 15 percent 
in 2002.  During the period 1990-2002, real growth in the value-added of the agriculture sector 
averaged 5 percent per year, rising from just 2.7 percent during the pre-reform period to 6.1 percent 
during the post-reform period, a major achievement.  However, fluctuations of production are a 
typical characteristic of the Yemeni agricultural sector, reflecting difficult climatic conditions.  The 
real GDP for agriculture grew only 1.2 percent in 1999 and 3.6 percent in 2002. 
As for the industrial sector, its contribution to real GDP averaged 34 percent during the 
period 1990-2002, with an average annual growth rate of about 5 percent (3.2 percent before the 
reforms and 6.0 percent after).  However, during the last three years of the post-reform period, the 
industrial sector’s real GDP declined by 1.8 percent in 2000 and grew by only 2.5 percent in 2001 and 
1.7 percent in 2002.  A drop in international oil prices during this period may explain the sector’s 
slowdown during this period.  Thus, the performance of the industrial sector in Yemen appears to be 
highly correlated with the growth in oil revenues, which registered an average annual growth rate of 
7.4 percent during the period 1991-95, compared with 6.4 percent during 1996-2001.  
Finally, despite the growth of the oil sector, the service sector remains the largest contributor 
to GDP in the country, averaging 47 percent during the period 1990-2002, higher than either the 
agricultural or industrial sectors.  Its real value-added grew by 6 percent per year on average during 
the period 1990-2002.  However, although the growth rate of real GDP was higher in the post-reform 
period than in the pre-reform period (6.3 versus 5.2 percent), its contribution to GDP declined from 
49.0 percent in 1990 to 44.4 percent in 2002.  
                                                 
2 Qat comes from a plant scientifically known as Katia-adeblions. A light drug is obtained from chewing the 
leaves of a cultivated and irrigated tree, largely grown and consumed in Yemen, where people chew it every 
afternoon.    7
While GDP growth during the post-unification period (1990-2002) has been relatively high, it 
translates into only a 1.6 percent increase in GDP per capita due to the high population growth rate 
(Figure 1).  This modest increase is reflected in the trend of private consumption per capita, which 
increased only 1.0 percent during the same period.  Furthermore, during the post-reform period, real 
private consumption per capita declined by 0.3 percent.  The development of other economic 
indicators is more encouraging.  Investment and saving rates grew significantly but are still relatively 
low by international standards.  Meanwhile, the government’s spending grew by 3.5 percent on 
average during 1990-2002.  The budget deficit was reduced to only 3 percent of GDP, which 
indicates that the economic reform successfully stabilized the economy, mainly by reducing indirect 
subsidies and transfers.  As a result, the inflation rate dropped to about 5.0 percent and the current 
account balance was in surplus in all post-reform years, except for 1998.  Nevertheless, this situation 
is not sustainable, and public revenues have increased at a slower pace than the increase in general 
expenditure.  Moreover, macroeconomic stabilization success has not improved the attractiveness of 
the country for foreign direct investment, which remains very low and concentrated in the oil sector.  
While Yemen is a highly open economy, its trade structure is dominated by oil exports and by 
consumption product imports (mainly industrial) (Appendix Table 2A). 
Poverty Profile 
The poverty description and indicators used in this section are directly based on two recent 
studies carried out by the World Bank (2002) and the Central Statistical Organization of Yemen 
(1999), using the 1998 Household Budget Survey data (HBS).  Earlier poverty estimates were based 
on the 1992 HBS as well as the 1999 National Poverty Phenomenon Survey (NPPS).  Both data sets 
suffer from bias.  The 1992 HBS is biased by the non-representativeness of the sample of households 
selected : urban observations represent 72 percent in the sample used, whereas the share of the urban 
population is estimated at about 20 percent for the same year.  This lack of representative weight 
prevents any meaningful poverty comparisons with the 1998 HBS.  Although the 1999 NPPS covers 
more households than the 1998 HBS (49,450 versus 3,780) and the sample is representative at the 
governorate level, its purpose is primarily to provide detailed information on access to services and 
other aspects of non-income living standards.  Its results are biased by seasonality effects, as it was 
conducted over only one month.   8
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Sources:  Established using data from World Bank (2004) 
Overall, the 1998 HBS is considered the only household budget survey providing adequate 
information on incomes and expenditures.  Since it was carried out during a full year and over four 
rounds, seasonal patterns in consumption, expenditure, and income, are adequately taken into 
account.  For these reasons, estimating the poverty trend between 1992 and 1999 cannot be done.  
Therefore, this analysis focuses on only one year of observation—1998. 
Poverty Line and Poverty Measures in Yemen  
Three main indicators are often used to measure poverty: 
•  Poverty incidence (P0)  
•  Poverty gap index (P1) 
•  Severity of poverty (P2)  
The Gini coefficient (Gin) is the indicator used for measuring the inequality of the income 
distribution and consumption expenditures.  Most of the poverty indicators related to Yemen have 
already been estimated by the World Bank (2002) and the Central Statistical Organization (1999).   9
Poverty Incidence (P0)  
The most common standard indicator is the incidence of poverty (also called the poverty rate 
or head-count rate).  P0 describes the percentage of the population whose per capita incomes, or total 
expenditures, are below the poverty line, that is, the population that cannot afford to buy an 
internationally recognized basic basket of goods.  The methodology used by the World Bank (2002) 
follows the approach developed by Ravallion (1994).  According to this approach, people are 
classified as poor if their consumption expenditure falls below a poverty line, which is defined as the 
value of a commodity basket containing both basic foodstuffs and non-food goods.  Hence, poverty 
lines are made up of two components: (1) a food poverty line, setting the cost of a food bundle to 
attain a food energy requirement equal to 2,200 calories per person per day, and (2) an allowance for 
basic non-food goods.  Using the 1998 HBS, the food poverty lines for Yemen are estimated in 
Yemeni rial (YR) at YR25,212 per person per year at the national level: YR25,116 in urban areas and 
YR25,236 in rural areas. 
Based on these food poverty lines, 18 percent of the population are classified as poor at the 
national level.  The incidence of food poverty is 10 percent in urban areas and 20 percent in rural 
areas.  Table 1 reports poverty estimates using three different poverty lines for the year 1998. 
As food poverty lines provide a measure of extreme poverty, an allowance is usually added 
for non-food basic consumption.  The resulting lines are usually referred to as lower poverty lines.  
Nationally, in 1998, the lower poverty lines for Yemen were YR38,520 per person per year, 
YR38,340 in urban areas, and YR 38,580 in rural areas.  Using the lower poverty lines, the incidence 
of poverty in Yemen was 41.8 percent in rural areas, 30.8 percent in urban areas, and 45.0 percent in 
rural areas. 
The upper poverty lines are estimated by adding the average non-food expenditure among 
households who actually spend on food an amount that is equal to the food poverty lines.  In 1998, 
the upper poverty lines for Yemen were YR56,640 per person per year at the national level, 
YR57,168 per person in urban areas, and YR56,484 in rural areas.  Based on the upper poverty lines, 
the incidence of poverty in Yemen reaches 66.9 percent at the national level, 69.6 percent in rural 
areas, and 57.8 percent in urban areas.   10
Poverty Gap Index (P1)  
The poverty gap index
3 measures the depth of poverty, considering both the number of poor 
people and how poor they are.  P1 is the combined measurement of the incidence and depth of 
poverty.  The estimated P1 of 13.2 percent at the national level in 1998 provides a measure of the 
ratio of the minimum cost of eliminating poverty, with perfect targeting to the maximum cost with no 
targeting.  As far as the severity of poverty is concerned, Table 1 shows the estimates of the squared 
poverty gap index (P1), a measure that takes into account not only the distance separating the poor 
from the poverty line, but also the degree of inequality among the poor.  It is the average value of the 
square of the depth of poverty for each individual.  The poorest people contribute relatively more to 
the index.  For Yemen, this indicator equals 13.2 percent at the national level.  However, rural 
poverty (at 14.7 percent) appears to be far more severe than urban poverty (at 8.2 percent).  
Severity of Poverty (P2) 
While P1 has clear advantages for some purposes, such as comparing policies that aim to 
reach the poorest, a ranking of dates, places, or policies in terms of the P2 should clearly reflect the 
severity of poverty.  It is the ability of this measure to order distributions in a better way than the 
alternatives that makes it useful, not the precise number obtained (Coudouel and Hentschel, 2000).   
                                                 
3 This measure is also called the Foster-Greer-Thorbeke (FGT) P1.    11
Table 1.  P0, P1, and P2 estimates for Yemen, 1998 (%) 
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Source: World Bank (2002). 
Gini Coefficient 
For measuring inequality in the distribution of income and consumption expenditures, the 
Gini coefficient is a widely used indicator.  Its value for the year 1998 at the national level is 
estimated at 0.32.  The estimation of the Gini coefficient at the regional level shows a high disparity 
in inequality between regions, which is more pronounced in rural (0.43) than in urban areas (0.40).   
Distribution of Total Expenditure Shares  
The distribution of total expenditure shares across population shares ranked by per capita 
expenditure is the second indicator that is often used for measuring inequality at the expenditure 
level.  According to the 1998 HBS, the richest 50 percent of the population spends 73 percent of the 
total expenditure at the national level, while the top 10 percent accounts for more than 25 percent of 
the total expenditure on consumption (Table 2).  
Table 2.  Distribution of total expenditures value by decile at the national level 
Decile  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9  10 
Consumption 
share (%) 
3.5 4.5 5.0 6.0 8.5 9.0 10.5 12.0 15.5 25.5   
Source: Central Statistical Organization, Yemen (1999)   12
Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Poor in Yemen 
The socio-demographic profile of the poor in Yemen fits a pattern common to many 
developing countries. According the World Bank (2002) and the Central Statistical Organization of 
Yemen (1999), poverty in Yemen is highly correlated with the following characteristics:  
Household size: Data shows that the incidence of poverty in Yemen increases sharply with 
rising household size.  In 1998, the average size of poor households was 8.2 (9.2 in urban areas and 
8.0 in rural areas), compared with the national average of 7.1. 
Child-adult ratio:  Incidence and depth of poverty steadily increase with rising ratios of 
children to adults.  In 1998, about 35 percent of households having more adults than children are 
poor, compared with 50 percent of households having a child-adult ratio between 2 and 3, and 66 
percent of households with child-adult ratios greater than 4. 
Dependency ratio:  This ratio measures the number of the very young (under age 15) and the 
very old (greater than age 65) per 100 persons who are between the ages of 15 and 64, the most 
economically productive years.  In 1998, the dependency ratio in Yemen was higher in poor 
households (158) than in better-off households (111).   
Age of individuals:  Incidence of poverty among children in 1998 was 21.1 percent higher 
than among adults.  About 53 percent of the poor are children, and about 46 percent of all children are 
poor, compared with 38 percent of all adults. 
Education level:  Education in Yemen has a strong correlation to poverty incidence, depth, 
and severity.  The higher the educational attainment of the head of the household, the lower the risk 
that the household will be poor.  Results from the 1998 HBS show that poverty rates are highest for 
households headed by illiterate persons (47.3 percent nationally, 48.8 percent in rural areas, and 39.9 
percent in urban areas).  Rates are relatively high and similar among households in which the head 
can read and write or has attained a primary-level education (38.6 percent).  Poverty rates are lowest 
for households headed by persons with a post-secondary education but still strikingly high in absolute 
terms: 22 percent nationally, 42 percent rural, and 11 percent urban.  At the national level, households 
headed by top-educated breadwinners account for 2.2 percent of the observed incidence of poverty, 
compared with 59 percent for households headed by illiterate persons.  More than 86 percent of poor 
households headed by illiterate breadwinners live in rural areas.  A similar pattern, which points to a 
sizeable urban-rural divide, is found in both the depth and the severity of poverty.   13
Economic Characteristics of the Poor 
The 1998 HBS data show that poverty is determined both by working status and the sector 
employing the head of household.  The World Bank (2002) and the Central Statistical Organization 
(1999) estimate that at the national level, 84 percent of the poor live in households headed by 
employed persons, 2.5 percent headed by the unemployed, and 13.5 percent headed by inactive 
breadwinners.  This pattern does not change significantly from urban to rural areas.  
The distribution of the poor by sector of activity of the head of household shows that, at the 
national level, most of the poor work in the agricultural sector (47.3 percent), followed by services 
(35.9 percent) and industry (16.8 percent).  Compared with the overall population distribution, the 
poor are over-represented in industry and agriculture.  In contrast, they tend to be under-represented 
in the service sector.  More specifically, in urban areas, 39 percent of the poor breadwinners work in 
the merchandise service sector, 24 percent in public administration, and 21 percent in industry.  In 
rural areas, 55 percent of the poor breadwinners work in agriculture, 29 percent in services, and 16 
percent in industry.  Among poor households, 84 percent work in the private sector and 15 percent in 
the public sector.  
Regarding sources of income, rural households derive their income from multiple sources 
within the rural economy and even from the urban economy.  According to the 1998 HBS, earnings 
from self-employment represent 39.1 percent of total income nationally, compared with 28.2 percent 
of wage earnings, and 8.3 percent of income from transfers.  The relative importance of wage 
earnings versus earnings from self-employment is very different between urban and rural areas.  In 
urban areas, wage earnings account for 43.3 percent and earnings from self-employment for 28.5 
percent, while in rural areas, the larger share of total income originates from self-employment 
activities (42.3 percent), and wage earnings account for 23.7 percent.  In urban areas, capital income 
has a 15 percent share of total income, which is five times the share of households in rural areas.  
Income from transfers represents 9.2 percent of total income in urban areas, compared with 8 percent 
for rural areas.  
The 1998 HBS data also show that the composition of total income changes significantly 
across per capita expenditure deciles.  The share of wage earnings decreases from 37.5 percent for the 
poorest decile to 23.0 percent for the richest decile.  For rural households in the top decile, wage 
earnings account for only 14 percent, compared with 37 percent for urban households.  Nationally, 
the share of income from self-employment increases from 32 percent for the richest decile to 43 
percent for the poorest decile.  In contrast, capital income as share of total income shows little   14
tendency to vary across deciles, especially in rural areas.  The share of income from transfers tends to 
increase mildly in urban areas (from 8.6 percent for households in the poorest decile to 10.6 percent 
for the richest decile), while it hardly varies in rural areas.   15
3.  PUBLIC SPENDING IN YEMEN 
Structure of Public Spending  
During the period 1996-2002, public spending averaged 31.5 percent of GDP, compared with 
28 percent during the first half of the 1990s.  More than 80 percent of the total budget expenditure 
was allocated to current spending with wages absorbing more than 41 percent of total spending.  
Nonetheless, it has declined since 1997 and currently constitutes about one-third of total spending.  
During 1996-2001, the government of Yemen paid more attention to the social sectors in an effort to 
improve the social conditions of the population.  Total public spending in social sectors (including 
subsidies, education, health, social welfare, housing and utilities, and cultural and religious services) 
increased from 41 percent of total spending and 11 percent of GDP in 1991-95 to 50 percent of total 
spending and 17 percent of GDP in 1996-2001.  Since subsidies are not targeted and are not pro-poor, 
including them in total social expenditures gives a misleading picture. 
A stricter definition of social sectors – (excluding subsidies) – shows that government 
expenditures in the social sectors averaged about 30 percent of the total public expenditure and 10 
percent of GDP during 1996-2001.  In real terms, and despite rapid population growth, public 
expenditures in the social sectors increased faster than total expenditures during the second half of the 
1990s.  Real expenditures in social sectors per capita increased by 13 percent per year during 1996-
2001, compared with 6 percent per year for total expenditures.  Table 3 presents the trend in public 
spending from 1991 to 2002.    16
Table 3.  Evolution of public spending on social sectors, 1991-2002 (values in YR 
billion and share in %) 
    1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total government 
spending  44  56  68  87  118 228 303 294 336 476 502 532 
% of GDP  29.2  29.3  28.4  28.3 
    
23.1 
        
30.9    34   34.2  28.7 
      
31.7 32.7   28.7
Social  spending  18  23  30  34  47  115 163 164 164 272 212    
    % of GDP  11.7  12.1  12.4  10.9    9.2 
     
15.8 
         
18.3    19   13.9    18   13.7   
    % of total 
government spending  40.2  41.5  43.8  38.6  40  50.8  53.7   55.5  48.9   56.9  42.2   
1. Subsidies and 
Transfers    4    5    7    8    9  53  89   69   54  122  38  30 
   % of total 
government spending     8.3    8.9    9.9    9.1    7.6  23.5  29.3   23.4  16   25.5    7.6    5.6
2. Education spending     9  11  14  17  23  37  46   57   67   89  108    
    % of total 
government spending  19.3  19  20.1  19.3  19.5  16.4  15.2   19.3  20   18.7  21.5   
3. Health spending    2.1    2.5    3.3    3.2    4.5    9.1  10   13.9  14.4   20.1  23.6   
    % of total 
government sending    4.8    4.4    4.9    3.6    3.8    4  3.3     4.7    4.3     4.2    4.7   
4. Social security and 
welfare    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9    1.1    1.6    1.7     4.4    5.9     7.7    8    
    % of total 
government spending    1.4    1.3    1.2    1.1    1    0.7    0.6     1.5    1.8     1.6    1.6   
5. Housing and 
utilities spending    2    3    4    3    7  11  12   15   18   26   26    
    % of total 
government spending    4.6    6.2    6.1    3.8    5.8    4.9    4     5.1    5.3     5.4    5.1   
6. Entertainment and 
religious spending    0.7    0.9    1.1    1.5    2.7    3.2    3.8    4.4     5.1     7.1    8.5   
  % of total 
government spending    1.7    1.6    1.7    1.8    2.3    1.4    1.2    1.5    1.5     1.5    1.7   
Source: World Bank (2002)   
Since food subsidies were not targeted and not particularly pro-poor, they were entirely 
phased out in 1999.  The World Bank’s (2002) assessment indicates that only 30 percent of the food 
subsidies reached consumers.  The rest went to exporters, distributors, and smugglers to neighboring 
countries.  The poorest groups of the population benefited very little from the subsidies because they 
spent disproportionately less on the subsidized food items than high-income groups.    17
Diesel fuel is the only consumer good that continues to be significantly subsidized in the 
country.  It is used primarily to run irrigation pumps, electricity generators, and fishing boats.  Some 
object to the diesel subsidy because they feel that it contributes to excessive pumping and inefficient 
use of water, to the detriment of the rural poor.  According to a recent study carried out by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005), about 60 percent of the direct diesel subsidy used by 
households is captured by the two top (income) deciles, while less than 2 percent filters down to the 
two lowest deciles.  At the same time, the aggregate impact of eliminating subsidies is regressive 
because of the dominance of the indirect impact through the rural labor market.  The government is 
under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to phase out the diesel subsidy by the year 2006. 
To compensate for any transitory negative effects associated with the removal of food 
subsidies in 2000, the government implemented several funds, such as the Social Welfare Fund 
(SWF), the Agriculture and Fisheries Production Promotion Fund (AFPPF), and the Social 
Development Fund (SDF).  
The SWF is the government’s main targeted social assistance program.  This fund was 
originally conceived in 1996 as a way to compensate the poor for the progressive removal of food 
subsidies.  In spite of drawbacks such as problems in reaching beneficiaries and extremely 
bureaucratic procedures (van de Walle, 2002) more than YR8 billion was spent on the SWF in 2001, 
benefiting 450,000 households, with a maximum of YR24,000 per household per year.  For a family 
of six, this translates to about YR333 per person per month or only about 10 percent of the 1998 
national poverty line.  Based on van de Walle’s (2002) evaluation of the program, 4.2 percent of the 
target group, or 0.88 percent of the population, received SWF transfers, and 57 percent of those who 
benefited from the program were not in the target group.  Of these, 41 percent were not poor and 16 
percent were poor.  
AFPPF was launched in 1995 in light of concerns that increases in diesel prices and eventual 
elimination of the diesel subsidy would affect the poorest population groups in rural and coastal areas.  
The poor in these areas are highly dependent on agriculture and fisheries both as consumers and 
producers.  The fund aims to promote agriculture, livestock and fisheries production through a wide 
range of activities in these sectors such as subsidizing the cost of agricultural inputs and equipment 
(seeds and fertilizer, for example), constructing water projects such as dams and smaller works to 
reduce the risks of drought and to recharge aquifers, and initiating production marketing schemes.  
The AFPPF is financed through a system whereby YR2.5 (increased from YR1.0 since 1995) is   18
deposited to the fund for every liter of diesel sold in the country.  Resources also come from the 
general budget and foreign grants.  The yearly budget is around YR 4.5 billion (US$25 to 27 million). 
SDF provides assistance for long-term development projects aimed at providing social and 
economic services –such as education, health care, water supply, and microfinance - creating jobs; 
and enhancing the capacity of local communities.  According to the IMF (2005), SDF has recently 
developed a strategy focusing on poverty alleviation in both rural and urban areas.  However, success 
has been limited because banks are still reluctant to extend credit to the development of the small and 
medium enterprises that are the focus of the fund.  
An Assessment of the Efficiency of Public Spending  
While the various government programs directed toward poverty alleviation help reduce the 
growing number of poor in the country, several drawbacks still limit the efficiency of these programs.  
For example, the SWF’s budget is generally too low to cover all of those potentially eligible.  
Concerning the AFPPF, resources are currently allocated to governorates on the basis of population 
and poverty indicators; governorates where qat is grown are considered rich and therefore excluded.  
Moreover, poverty indicators are imprecise. 
Health Sector 
While public spending in all social sectors has increased during 1996-2001, the level remains 
low in targeted sectors in comparison to other countries in the region.  For the health sector, Yemen 
spent considerably less of its public budget in 1997 on health (3.3 percent) than most of its regional 
neighbors (unweighted regional average of 6.7 percent).  And a far larger share of overall health 
expenditures comes from private sources– only 37.9 percent of health expenditures in Yemen are 
from the public sector compared with a regional average of 50.5 percent (World Bank, 2000b).  Table 
4 compares health spending in Yemen with the rest of the countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) in 1997.   19
Table 4.  Health spending in Yemen compared with other MENA countries, 1997 
Country  Total (Public and 
Private) Health 
Expenditure as 







































































































Unweight Avg  4.5  307  50.5  6.7 
Source: World Bank (2000b) 
Education 
According to the World Bank (2002), the recent rise in education spending in Yemen is 
largely driven by rising employment opportunities for teachers and increasing wages than by 
increasing investment expenditures.  These expenditures show a declining tendency.  While school   20
enrollments in Yemen have increased substantially at all levels,
4 the coverage is still low, and access 
to education services is uneven between genders.  Gaps between rural and urban areas and among 
governorates are still large (see World Bank 2002 for a detailed assessment of the education system in 
Yemen).  The World Bank's assessment suggests that improving educational opportunities for the 
poor and under-served population should be considered as a top priority of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP)
5.  In this context, strategies to increase public spending on education and 
better target additional capital investment to the poorest population seem to be effective in reducing 
poverty. 
Infrastructure  
Despite improvements realized over the past years in infrastructure, it is still below the 
desired standard and is characterized by geographical variances and bias toward the urban areas and 
the most fortunate groups.  Infrastructure services also suffer from numerous difficulties due to 
population growth and high rate of migration to urban areas, leading to increased pressure on 
infrastructure.  Many projects and high financing are needed to improve infrastructure services, 
especially in rural areas.  Thus, increasing water production for domestic uses, expanding the scope of 
wastewater sanitation services, rehabilitating existing power stations, increasing investment in 
electricity generation and distribution, construction of a road network to link industrial and 
agricultural production centers are among the priority areas for improvement of infrastructure 
identified in the PRSP.  
Furthermore, expansion of basic education and heath services, improvement of vocational 
training and technical education, and reform of higher education are considered to be the main factors 
for improving human capital, rather than infrastructure.  Finally, the expansion of agricultural 
production, which remains the source of income for most of the Yemeni population, may be achieved 
mainly through irrigation improvement and by encouraging agricultural research to better manage 
irrigated agriculture and natural resources. 
                                                 
4 During the period 1995-2000, enrollments increased by about 30 percent in basic and 50 percent in secondary education. 
Higher education more than doubled, and vocational and technical training enrollments increased by about 40 percent 
(World Bank, 2002). 
5 The PRSP is a government document that sets priorities of government interventions to achieve clear poverty reduction 
goals. The document is prepared in line with the government’s development programs, the principles of the economic 
reforms program and the overall framework of the Second Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic development 2001-
2005.     21
4.  EVALUATION OF INCREASING PUBLIC SPENDING ON POVERTY 
REDUCTION IN PRIORITY AREAS 
Description of the Model Structure and Main Features 
The model used in this study originates from a prototype model (Beghin et al., 1996) built for 
trade analysis at the Development Centre of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  It is a standard neoclassical recursive dynamic model with imperfect substitution 
between domestic and foreign goods.  Prices are endogenous in each market (goods and factors) and 
equalize supply (imports, Yemeni production for the domestic market, and factor supply) and demand 
(final demand from households, the government, investors and the rest of the world, intermediate 
demand from producers, and factor demand), at the equilibrium.  The equilibrium is general in the 
sense that it concerns all the markets simultaneously.  The model is dynamic and is solved recursively 
every two years from 1998 to 2016. 
Production 
Supply is modeled using nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions, which 
describe the substitution and complementary relations among the various inputs.  Producers are cost-
minimizers and constant return to scale is assumed.  Output is produced from two inputs, an 
intermediate aggregate and a value-added aggregate.  The intermediate aggregate is obtained by 
combining all products in fixed proportions (Leontief structure).  The value-added components are 
decomposed into two parts: aggregate labor and capital.  Given the crucial importance of labor 
demand and labor remuneration in poverty incidence variation, the labor modeling is described in 
more detail below.  
The capital bundle incorporates three types of capital: land, non-renewable resources in oil 
and gas, and physical capital accumulated through past investment.  The first two capital stocks are 
sector-specific.  The third decomposes itself between two generations of capital: "old" and "new."  
New capital results from contemporary investment and may be allocated more flexibly than “old” 
capital.  Substitution possibilities of all inputs and labor (which are functions of relative prices) will   22
be greater with the new vintage of capital (that is, the contemporary investment) than with the other 
(that is, the installed capital).
6  
Income and Absorption 
 Income from labor and land is allocated between the various households using a standardized 
fixed-coefficient distribution matrix.  Income from capital is allocated in the same way between 
households and the rest of the world.  Income from oil is paid totally to the government.  Household 
total demand is derived by maximizing the utility function derived from the Extended Linear 
Expenditure System (ELES).  The household's utility is a function of consumption of different goods 
and savings and is constrained by disposable income.  Income elasticities are differentiated by 
product and households; they vary from 0.80 for agricultural and minerals products to 1.20 for 
services.  The calibration of the model determines a per capita subsistence minimum for each product 
whose aggregate consumption grows with population, while the remaining demand is derived through 
an optimization process.  Household utility is a positive function of consumption of the various 
products and savings, with income elasticity for each product being set to unity.  Households pay 
taxes on this income and save the remainder.  Government and investment demands are disaggregated 
in sectoral demands once their total value is determined according to fixed coefficient functions. 
International Trade 
The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods originating from the domestic 
market and the rest of the world.  Import demand results from a CES aggregation function of 
domestic and imported goods.  Export supply is symmetrically modeled as a constant elasticity of 
transformation function.  Producers decide to allocate their output to domestic or foreign markets 
responding to relative prices.  Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported products is set at 
2.2.  The elasticity of transformation between products intended for the domestic market and products 
for export is 5.0.
7  
The small country assumption holds.  Since Yemen is unable to change world prices, its 
import and export prices are therefore exogenous.  Capital transfers are exogenous as well and 
determine the trade balance.  
                                                 
6  Elasticities are derived from the available relevant literature (see Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins 1992).  For instance, the 
substitution elasticity between labor and old and new capital is set respectively at 0.1 and 1.0. Elasticities between 
intermediates and value-added are set at 0 (if the latter incorporates old capital) and 0.5 (in the case of new capital). 
7 Trade elasticities come from the empirical literature devoted to CGE models. They are not specific to Yemen. See for 
instance Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (1992), Konan and Maskus (1997), or more recently, Gallaway, McDaniel, and 
Rivera (2000). These elasticities are not distinguished by product, which explains to a large extent, their low levels. They are 
not statistically significant either.   23
Labor Specifications 
 The assumption of full employment and flexible wages for achieving equilibrium in the labor 
market cannot be used for any study related to labor market or poverty analysis.  In fact, labor 
demand and remuneration by segment and skill are among the main factors explaining poverty.  For 
this reason, a realistic modeling of labor market behavior and wage setting is crucial for any poverty 
analysis study.  
The modeling of the labor market in the present study follows the work of Dessus and Suwa-
Eisenman (1999) for Egypt.  Labor supply at each period depends first on an exogenous factor 
affected by demographic trend and external migration.  Between two periods, migration movements 
occur between segments, depending on relative expected earnings, that is wages multiplied by the 
employment rate of the previous period.  A change in relative expected wages thus induces migration 
(the cost of migration and the non-wage benefit in the public sector being constant).  Due to the 
segmentation of markets, it is assumed that a worker can only modify one of his job's characteristics 
at a time.  For instance, a rural worker in the private sector would compare his state with that of a 
rural worker in the public sector or an urban worker in the private sector.  Conversely, he cannot 
move directly to the urban public sector.  Finally, it is assumed that households follow the migrants 
and adopt the consumption behavior of their new location.  
Labor supply in the private sector is also a function of real wages, differentiated by skills the 
higher the skill, the higher the supply elasticity.  The unskilled part of the private labor market 
accounts for the informal sector.  It is assumed that most workers (skilled and unskilled) queuing for a 
public job are actually working in this informal sector, thus augmenting the labor supply in that 
segment.  This assumption is realistic in the case of Yemen as average wages in the public sector are 
higher than in the private sector by approximately 30 percent.   
Model Closure and Dynamics  
 The model is solved for each period, under several macro-closures.  First, as the small 
country assumption is adopted and capital transfers are also exogenous, the trade balance is fixed so 
as to achieve a balance-of-payments equilibrium.  Second, the model imposes a fixed real government 
deficit and fixed real public expenditures.  Thus, public receipts adjust endogenously to achieve the 
predetermined net government position by shifting households’ income tax.
8 Third investment is 
determined by the availability of savings from households, the government, and abroad.  Since 
                                                 
8 This closure policy may be understood as a net transfer from households to government (or the reverse).     24
government and foreign savings are exogenous in this model, changes in investment volumes reflect 
changes in household savings and changes in the price of investment.  The sequential dynamic path of 
the model results from this closure on investment, the assumptions on labor supply explained above 
and exogenous growth rates for the natural reserves and the TFP.  Agents are assumed to be myopic 
and to base their decisions on static expectations about prices and quantities.  However, the closure 
rule for the government fiscal balance is modified for the purpose of this study.  [SENSE?: more 
clear!] In fact, any additional public spending needed for poverty reduction has to be financed.  Many 
options exist for this, such as shifting the rate of current tax instruments to achieve a target, reducing 
expenditures in other sectors, or increasing foreign aid.  For each available option, a sensitivity 
analysis may be carried out to select the most appropriate tool to improve public spending without 
compromising budget stability and economic growth in the country.  
Policy Impact 
To assess the policy effects of the reform, macro-economic aggregates, trade volumes, 
sectoral outputs, household welfare, and poverty indicators are compared with those in the baseline 
scenario.  The chosen yardstick for welfare is the assessment of equivalent variation, which is the sum 
of two terms.  The first measures the gain (or the loss) of disposable income caused by the reform 
(producer surplus), and the second measures the income needed after the reform to obtain the same 
level of utility as before the reform (consumer surplus).  
The Social Accounting Matrix and the Structure of the Economy in the Base Year 
The model uses information contained in Yemen’s Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
1998 built especially for the purpose of this study.  It considers two representative Yemeni 
households, one rural and one urban.  In all, nine economic sectors and eight types of work are taken 
into account, the latter being distinguished notably by the skills required, area, and status.  The model 
takes into account three types of capital: physical capital, land, and oil rent. 
Appendix Table 3A shows the macro SAM for Yemen for the year 1998, which is a tabular 
presentation of the National Accounts.  Each entry presents a payment by a column account to a row 
account, and the corresponding row and column sums must be equal.  They represent the income and 
expenditure accounts for various economic actors, and the SAM effectively shows the circular flow of 
income and expenditure from producers through factor markets to different non-government 
institutions households and the rest of the world and back to producers through commodity markets.  
The CGE model is based on a more detailed SAM − a “micro” SAM− with disaggregation of   25
activities, commodities, factors, domestic non-government institutions, and a macro-savings 
investment account (S-I), The rest of the world is also an actor buying exports, selling imports, and 
providing and receiving transfers and factor income.  
In the SAM, GDP at factor cost is the payment by activities to factors (YR714,407.6 million).  
Government revenue is shown along the government row and is largely from oil (42.4 percent) and 
transfers from abroad (17.3 percent).  Tax revenue is also an important share of total government 
revenue.  It represents 40.2 percent of total government revenue.  Taxes on income and profits are 
largely the most important source of government tax revenue (48.7 percent), followed by tariffs (27.8 
percent), and indirect taxes on production net of subsidies (23.5 percent).  Among its current 
expenditure, wages and salaries represent, so far, the most important share (60.2 percent) followed by 
public final consumption on goods and services (28.2 percent) and direct transfers to households 
(11.6 percent).  Government saving (government to S-I) is large, with a share equal to 37.6 percent of 
total savings.  Aggregate saving from abroad is also important in Yemen, mainly in the oil and gas 
sector.  Its share exceeds 13.5 percent of total savings in the country.  Private saving represents about 
half of aggregate investment, where “private or households” refers to all domestic non-government 
saving.  Exports (world to commodities) represent just under a third of GDP at factor cost, while 
imports (commodities to world) are much bigger (56.7 percent) ─ foreign savings (minus world to S-
I, the current account balance) is then large.  
Table 5 provides information about the sectoral structure of value-added and trade.  Services 
(dominated by public administration and defense) represent 51 percent of total value-added and the 
next largest sector, mining and quarrying (mainly oil and gas), represents around 14.3 percent.  
Imports are concentrated in manufactured products (45.1 percent of total imports) and services (27.7 
percent).  Exports, however, are dominated by mining and quarrying products (83.5 percent of total 
exports), followed by services (10.6 percent), and plants (2.8 percent). 
   26



























Plants       9.1      7.4     2.8  5.6    12.1  31.3   
Livestock       4.9      3.9     0.2  0.6      5.6  28.6   
Fishing      2.3      1.7     1.8  14.7      0.1    2.3   
Other agriculture      4.1      3.3      0.5  2.3      4.3  26.2   
Mining and Quarrying    14.3    16.7    83.5  72.3      5.1  39.9   
Manufacturing      8.9    18.0      0.6  0.5    45.1  53.7   
Electricity, Water, and      0.8      1.0      0.0  0.0      0.0    0.0   
Construction      4.6      7.0      0.0  0.0      0.0    0.0   
Services 51.0 40.9 10.6 3.8 27.7 49.5
Total  100 100  100 14.5  100 38.8   
Source:  Social Accounting Matrix for Yemen, 1998. 
Note:  Data are rounded to one decimal point. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of workers among the different sectors of the economy.  Public 
administration and defense are excluded.  Private workers are mostly employed in the agriculture 
sector.  Private urban workers are mostly occupied in the service sectors.  Public workers are mostly 
employed in the mining and service sectors.  Regarding the source of income for households in 
Yemen, Table 7 shows that capital income represents the main income source (57.5 percent), 
followed by wages (20.2 percent), and by remittances from abroad (19.4 percent).  The contribution 
of each source of income is slightly different according to the area of residence of the households.    27
Table 6.  Sectoral distribution of workers (%) 














Plants      34.2       2.2       6.3      0.6  1157486 
Livestock      18.4       1.2       4.6      0.5    625358 
Fishing       0.4       0.1     14.9    16.0      26073 
Other agriculture     15.7       1.0       1.4      0.3    530571 
Mining and Quarrying       0.1       0.3     11.0    40.4      23719 
Manufacturing       3.4       9.4       6.6    13.3     189582 
Electricity, Water and Gas        0.1       1.8     14.8      7.3       26743 
Construction       4.7       5.1     14.3      9.3     205482 
Services       23.1   78.9   26.1  12.4  1368370
Total  100 100  100 100  4153384 
Source:  Author’s compilations based on many Central Statistical Organization (CSO) publications. 
Note: Public administration and defense are excluded. 







Wages   31.2  15.7  20.2 
Land Rent   0.2  0.7  0.6 
Capital 65.6  54.1  57.5 
Transfers from Government  2.0  2.5  2.3 
Remittances from Abroad  1.0  27.0  19.4 
Total 100  100  100 
Source:  Social Accounting Matrix for Yemen, 1998 
Estimation of Growth Poverty Elasticities 
The international record based on the experiences of many countries, shows that economic 
growth is the most effective anti-poverty tool.  Growth-oriented policies are considered to be the most 
effective vehicle for expanding the revenue base, which, in turn, leads to a reduction in poverty.  In 
their paper, van Eeghen and Soman (1996) argue that empirical results are consistent with 
international evidence for most countries in the world.  The MENA region provides clear evidence for 
such an assumption.  Experience in the MENA, over the past decade, suggests that there is indeed a 
strong empirical relationship between poverty alleviation and economic growth, which is shown by a 
relatively high growth elasticity of poverty reduction.  Results from the World Bank's poverty 
assessments in four countries in the region for the period 1985-94 highlight the link between growth 
and poverty reduction despite the important contrast in growth achievements in these countries.    28
While sustained growth in per capita GDP occurred in Morocco and Tunisia and poverty declined, 
Jordan suffered a sharp drop in per capita GDP and poverty increased (van Eeghen and Soman 1996).  
The growth elasticity is negative and varies from −2.5 to −6.2 for the three countries (when estimated 
at a poverty line of US$1 per day at 1985 Parity Purchase Power (PPP).  This means that for every 1 
percent increase in real GDP growth, the number of poor people declines by 2.5 to 6.2 percent in the 
country.  Conversely, this also means that a fall of 1.0 percent in real GDP growth increases the 
number of poor people by 2.5 to 6.2 percent.  According to van Eeghen and Soman (1998), the 
relatively high growth elasticity may be explained by the fact that MENA’s income inequality was 
initially low and by the choice of $ 1 per person per day as the poverty line.   
CGE models allow the identification and quantification, albeit at rather disaggregated levels, 
of some of the most important transmission channels relevant to poverty changes, including relative 
factor and commodity price changes and capital deepening caused by domestic savings.  Just using 
the growth figures estimated by a CGE model would forfeit most of the model’s explanatory and 
numerical measurement power.  Instead, such a model is primarily an instrument for counterfactual 
(what if?) analysis, rather than a tool for growth forecasting.  For these reasons, using estimates on 
real mean consumption per capita rather than per capita income growth allows both the income 
distributional effect among the different household categories in the analysis and the changes in 
consumption patterns to be taken into account.  The latter depends on changes in income and 
consumption price vectors.  
Thus, the CGE model provides results on changes in real per capita consumption by 
household category.  The use of estimates on growth elasticity of real per capita consumption for 
poverty reduction by household category allows for the estimation of some poverty measures related 
to any simulation provided in the medium to long run.  Results of different household surveys are 
used to estimate the growth elasticity of real private consumption per capita for poverty reduction. 
Despite the fact that (1) very few shocks to an economy are distributionally neutral over 
sectors and income groups, and (2) an approach that combines the mean real per capita consumption 
figures from a CGE with a poverty elasticity (here growth of real per capita consumption elasticity for 
poverty reduction) does not seem very promising in evaluating the full poverty impact of public 
policy reform within each household category, this approach nevertheless represents an intermediate 
tool to assess the change in poverty level between the representative household (RH) approach and 
the micro-simulation approach.  Using only the RH approach does not help estimate poverty changes, 
and the analysis is limited to evaluating welfare change for the representative household.  In contrast,   29
the micro-simulation approach allows the evaluation of the effect of any economic reform on an 
individual household, which in turn, allows new poverty indicators to be estimated related to any 
given reform (P0, P1, and P2).  
In the case of Yemen and for the purpose of this study, the poverty line used in the estimation 
of the growth of the mean real per capita consumption elasticity of poverty reduction is the lower 
poverty line estimated by the World Bank at national as well as at regional levels.  The approach used 
to estimate the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to the mean real consumption per capita 
entails increasing per capita consumption by x percent and estimating the new poverty rates at the 
national and regional levels for the whole sample in the 1998 HBS.  It is supposed that consumption 
distribution remains unchanged between the two situations: the initial or base year (1998) and the 
simulation period for each household category.  Thus, for the given new level of poverty in Yemen, 
the rate of poverty reduction associated with a 1 percent increase in real consumption by year and by 
person is estimated. 
In addition, to estimate the elasticities for P1 and P2 with respect to the mean real 
consumption per capita, formulas derived from Kakwani (1990) are used.  Accordingly, the elasticity 
for the Poverty gap index (P1) is measured by  
 
1 / 0 1 1 P P P − = ε .         ( 1 )  
  
Similarly, the elasticity for P2 with respect to the mean real consumption per capita is estimated using 
the following formula: 
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The results obtained are presented in Table 8.    30
Table 8.  Elasticity with respect to mean real consumption per capita 
  P0 P1 P2 
Yemen  −1.8  −2.8  −3.1 
Urban Areas  −2.5  −2.1  −2.4 
Rural Areas  −1.7  −2.2  −2.6 
Note:  The poverty line used is the lower poverty line.  Figures are rounded to one decimal point. 
For Yemen, an increase of 1 percent in the mean real private consumption per capita reduces 
the number of the poor by 1.8 percent.  The effect of growth in real private consumption is more 
important for urban households than for rural.  An increase of 1 percent of the mean real consumption 
per capita reduces the number of the poor in urban areas by 2.5 percent, while it reduces the number 
of poor in rural areas by only 1.7 percent.  The reason behind this may be found in the poverty gap 
index, which is higher in rural areas than in urban areas.  The use of these elasticities enables each 
simulation on increasing public spending per sector to be associated with new poverty indicator 
numbers.  
Economic and Poverty Trends in the Baseline Scenario  
In the CGE modeling framework, it is essential to establish a baseline scenario that is 
counterfactual for comparing the outcome of a policy shock.  In a dynamic analysis, this involves 
drawing on additional exogenous information to define what seems to be a plausible growth path for 
the Yemeni economy up to 2016.  Such information would include data on projected growth trends 
for macro variables such as population, labor force, and depreciation of capital stock.  This should not 
be interpreted as an exercise in forecasting but as an attempt to define a benchmark for comparing 
alternative policy scenarios in order to isolate their specific effects.
9  
In constructing the baseline scenario, a figure is defined for the rate of growth in the 
economy.  TFP is then endogenous.  When simulating alternative policies, the previously estimated 
TFP becomes exogenous and GDP endogenous. 
                                                 
9 The fact that the value of exogenous variables are set on a priori  basis within a realistic confidence interval, does not, 
however, have any major consequences. When the impact of alternative economic policies is assessed, it may be seen that 
these choices have very little effect on either amplitude or sign of the variations in the different aggregates relative to the 
baseline scenario (Chemingui and Dessus  2001).   31
Growth Hypotheses  
To construct a baseline scenario, the values of a number of variables are set exogenously.  
These include the rate of growth in GDP, which is set over the time horizon of the model to match 
actual growth rates as well as to follow rates projected by the World Bank (2002).  The actual average 
of annual GDP growth is 4.5 percent for the period between 1998 and 2001.  A 3 percent annual 
growth is projected for the period between 2001 and 2016.  Similarly, population growth rates follow 
the government forecasts, where rural population is assumed to grow at an average annual rate of 1.9 
percent, while the annual average growth rate for the urban population is expected to be 5.7 percent 
during the same period (the numbers account for the expected migration flows between rural and 
urban areas).  Labor supply over the same time period is expected to continue to grow at high rates, 
compared with other MENA countries. 
In the rural areas, labor supply grows by 3.5 percent per year, while urban labor force 
categories grow at an annual average growth rate of 3.4 percent.  Annual growth rates for the labor 
market categories take into account the expected increase of women’s participation in the labor 
market and labor mobility from one sector of employment to another (from rural to urban areas) and 
from unskilled to skilled categories.  In addition, the baseline growth path assumes that oil and gas 
extraction is expected to decline by an annual average rate of 2 percent during the period 1998-2013 
to become constant by the year 2013 (a result of newly planned investments in oil and gas over the 
coming years).  Total cultivated area declines by 2 percent yearly as a result of high urbanization and 
scarce water resources.  Workers’ remittances, which represent an important source of household 
income in Yemen remain unchanged during the simulation period. 
Economy and Poverty in Yemen in the Absence of Public Spending Reforms  
It is assumed here that the government abandons its policy of fiscal stabilization, given the 
high poverty rate in the country and the difficulties associated with any cut in direct and indirect 
transfers to households, mainly for the poorest.  For this reason, the model imposes an increase in 
budget spending (excluding investment) in real terms by 4 percent between 1998 and 2001, by 3.7 
percent between 2001 and 2010 and 3.2 percent after 2010.  Public receipts are adjusted 
endogenously to achieve the predetermined net government position by shifting the household 
income tax.  This closure policy may be understood as a net transfer from households to government 
(or the reverse).  This type of policy is considered by economists to be the most neutral way to assess 
economic policy reform.  Other closures may be tested, adjusting indirect taxes, for instance.  
However, this would bear the risk of introducing new distortions into the economy, thereby making it   32
more difficult to conceptually isolate the impact of the public spending policy.  Tables 9 to 12 present 
economic and poverty trends in the baseline scenarios.  
Table 9.  Macroeconomic trend in the baseline scenario 
      1998 (YR billion)     2016 (%)   
Real Gross Domestic Product      811.2      3.2   
Total Production    1478.0      3.0   
Private Consumption     592.5      2.7   
Real Urban Available Income     216.3      5.0   
Real Rural Available Income     528.4      1.4   
Investment     338.9      0.6   
Exports     228.0      2.1   
Imports      405.2      1.3   
Government Revenue     277.6     -1.0   
GDP deflator       100     -0.9   
Notes: Macroeconomic aggregates in the base year (1998) are expressed in billions of 1998 YR, whereas for the 
simulation period, these aggregates are expressed in average yearly percentage changes compared to the base 
year. Real available income levels are the available income levels in 1998 YR, divided by the consumer price 
index for each area. 
Source: Model results 
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Table 10.  Trend in real wages by segment in the baseline scenario 
 1998  (YR billion)  2016  (%)   
Rural Unskilled Workers in the Public  192.5  -5.8   
Rural Skilled Workers in the Public  192.6  -5.8   
Rural Unskilled Workers in the Private  16.7  -1.1   
Rural Skilled Workers in the Private  20.3  -2.8   
Urban Unskilled workers in the public  192.7  -5.8   
Urban Skilled Workers in the Public  192.5  -5.8   
Urban Unskilled Workers in the Private  16.9  -1.3   
Urban Skilled Workers in the Private  20.3  -3.0   
Notes: Real wages in the base year (1998) are expressed in billions of 1998 YR, whereas for the simulation 
period these wages are expressed in average yearly percentage changes compared to the base year.  
Source:  model results 
The rate of growth in TFP (which relates to physical capital and labor) is also determined 
endogenously in this initial scenario.  Notably, it is dependent on the rate of growth in the economy 
and the initial stock of physical capital, which in turn determines the rate at which the latter 
accumulates.  Results show that the investment rate (expressed as percentage of GDP) falls from 41.8 
percent in 1998 to 26.3 percent in 2016.  Finally, the assumption is made that there is a hardening in 
external constraints.  In 2016, the deficit in the trade balance falls to 12.4 percent of GDP, compared 
with 21.8 percent in 1998.   
Although an increasing trend is assumed toward achieving a constant annual growth rate of 
real public sector wages (after a 10 percent decline during the period 1998-2001), wages in real terms 
do not recover to the initial level and continue to report a decline over the simulation period (Table 
10).  Thus, workers in the public rural sector end up with their wages reporting an annual decline of 
5.8 percent in real terms while the drops in real wages are less pronounced for the private sector in the 
rural areas.  Real wages for unskilled workers in the rural private sector decline by 1.1 percent per 
year, and real wages for skilled workers in the rural private sector decline by 2.8 percent.  The 
expected increase in the skilled labor force, compared to the unskilled, in the coming years may 
explain such differentials in wage evolution in the private sector.  The same tendency is observed for 
urban public workers where their real wages decline by 5.8 percent per year, on average.  
The decline in real wages in the private sector is more important in the urban than the rural 
sector (−1.3 percent for unskilled workers and −3.0 percent for skilled workers in the urban private 
sector).  Given the conditions defined above for the baseline scenario and the simulated declines in   34
real wages as a result of the public wage policy, demand for labor will increase for all categories and 
consequently unemployment is expected to decline.  The declines in unemployment are more 
important for skilled workers than unskilled (−6.9 percent and 0 percent per year, respectively, on 
average, in rural areas and −1.9 percent and −0.3 percent per year, respectively, on average, in urban 
areas) (Table 11).  
Table 11.  Trend in unemployment rates by skill and areas in the baseline scenario 
  1998 (%)  2016 (%)   
Rural Unskilled       16.4      0.0   
Rural Skilled         6.4    −6.9  
Urban Unskilled      12.01    −0.3  
Urban Skilled         8.1    −1.9  
Source:  Author’s estimation using various CSO publications 
Table 12.  Poverty incidence trend in the baseline scenario 
      1998       2016 
Poverty Incidence in % 
    National Level 
    Urban Areas 
    Rural Areas  
 
    41.8 
    30.8 
    45.0 
 
    29.2 
    14.3 
    29.6 
Number of Poor (in 1,000 persons) 
    National Level 
    Urban Areas 






    1.2% 
    1.3% 
  −0.5% 
Note:  Poverty incidence is expressed in percentage of total population in each year. The number of poor is 
expressed in 1,000 persons in the base year (1998) and in the annual average percentage change to 2016.  
Data are rounded to one decimal.  
As for the effect on poverty in the baseline scenario, P0  is expected to decline as a result of 
growth. At the national level, the number of people living below the poverty line falls from 41.8 
percent in 1998 to 29.2 percent in 2016. The decline in poverty is more important in urban areas (4.2 
percent per year) than in rural areas (2.3 percent), falling from 30.8 percent of total population in 
urban areas in 1998 to 14.3 percent in 2016 and from 45.0 percent for rural populations in 1998 to 
29.6 percent in 2016.  Although P0 declines during the simulation period, the absolute number of 
poor will increase by 1.2 percent per year at the national level.  The number of poor increase only in   35
the urban areas, with an annual average increase of 1.3 percent, while the number of poor in rural 
areas declines by nearly 0.5 percent per year.  
Public Spending Experiments  
The assumptions for the public spending experiments are presented in Table 13.  All the 
simulations involve an increase of public spending for priority areas while keeping the level of public 
spending in the other areas constant.  Rather than assuming a reallocation of public spending into 
alternative priority areas, following the work of Lofgren and Robinson (2004), an increase in public 
spending is justified and more suitable for Yemen.  According to the World Bank (2002) and the 
PRSP, public investments in the social sectors and infrastructure are considered low by international 
standards.  Furthermore, expenditure shares on health and education services are low, and gaps 
between rural and urban areas and among governorates are still very large.  
Infrastructure is still below the desired standard and is characterized by geographical 
variances and bias toward the urban areas and against the most vulnerable groups.  For these reasons, 
reallocating public spending into alternative priority areas may not be feasible politically, socially, 
and economically.  It is not feasible politically since the reallocation of public spending necessarily 
consists of reducing current spending in one area and reallocating it to another area.  This is 
politically sensitive because public spending is dominated by current spending (mostly wages).  Thus, 
cutting wages is often not feasible politically and socially.  And according to the PRSP, reduction of 
poverty in Yemen will be achieved through improvement of infrastructure and social services in the 
country, which will be done through additional public spending.  Effectively, this type of spending 
increases a country’s institutional, infrastructural, and human capital.  The private sector has less 
incentive to provide this type of capital, since its provision by one private firm tends to make the 
services of this capital available to all.  The private firm cannot internalize all of the benefits of its 
investment in this type of capital and consequently tends to be under-supplied.  
Both better targeting of new government spending and international aids are identified as the 
two complementary instruments for poverty reduction.  Thus, additional public spending has to be 
designed to generate a faster growth rate of GDP, which should reduce poverty.  The empirical 
literature strongly suggests that faster GDP growth is associated with more rapid poverty reduction.  
Lofgren and Robinson (2004) present a detailed review of literature on the positive correlation 
between growth and poverty reduction.    36
In this context, the work of Barro (1997) illustrates this point.  Barro’s study focuses on the 
institutional factors found to be most conducive to and most harmful for growth and rising standards 
of living in more than 100 countries around the world since 1960.  He focuses on the statistical 
correlations between institutional influences and average rates of economic growth in various 
countries.  His empirical hypothesis is the idea of "conditional convergence." If all national 
economies were basically the same except for the respective amounts of capital with which they were 
endowed, then the hypothesis suggests that the countries with smaller amounts of capital would 
experience higher annual per capita rates of real growth than countries with larger endowments of 
capital.  The long-run tendency, therefore, is for poorer countries to catch up with richer countries in 
terms of GDP per capita.  
According to Barro’s study, government policies with respect to levels of consumption 
spending, protection of property rights, and distortions of domestic and international markets are 
among the main factors affecting the level of economic growth.  Thus, investments in human capital 
in the form of secondary and higher education are highly significant in their effects on potential rates 
of growth.  The better and more highly trained the work force, the more productive they are in 
helping to enhance the rate of annual real output in a society.  At the same time, the lower the rate of 
population increase relative to the rate of growth in the capital supply, the more capital may be 
invested per worker to increase the average output of each member of the work force.  After looking 
at various types of government policies and their effects on economic growth in the surveyed 
countries, Barro concludes that "The growth rate tends to be higher if the government protects 
property rates, maintains free markets, and spends little on non-productive consumption."  
In this study, two categories of financing of additional public spending are assessed.  Both of 
them consist of increasing public spending in priority areas while keeping its level unchanged in the 
remaining areas.  For the first category of public spending experiments, additional government 
spending on social sectors and infrastructure is generated through an adjustment of direct public 
transfers to households.  In fact, according to the closure rules adopted in this study, the model 
generates a new coefficient of public transfers to households (net of direct taxes).  This situation is 
compared with that prevailing in the baseline scenario to meet the additional spending level for 
selected areas.  In the second category, and given the weak level of government resources, it is 
assumed that any additional government spending will be financed by direct international transfers in 
the form of foreign aid.  Considered a less-developed country, Yemen benefits from high 
international assistance in the form of aid, representing almost 23 percent of government expenditures 
in the year 1999 (World Bank 2004).   37
For every financing schema adopted, three alternative public spending scenarios are assessed 
at the beginning.  The scenarios are (1) increasing public spending on agricultural infrastructure 
(SIMAGR), (2) increasing public spending on education services (SIMEDU), and (3) increasing 
public spending on health services (SIMHEA).  The assumptions for these scenarios are presented in 
Table 13. 
Table 13.  Assumed elasticities of public spending 









TFP in agriculture 
TFP in all sectors 
TFP in all sectors 
Sources:  Elasticity estimates are from Barro (1997) and Mundlak, Larson and Butzer (1997). 
The first experiment (SIMAGR) consists of evaluating the effect of a gradual increase in 
public spending allocated to agriculture from 0.5 percent of GDP in 1998 to 1.5 percent in 2010 and 
after.  Its aim is to improve agricultural yields through investment in public agricultural research and 
infrastructure, which is assumed to increase the long-run TFP level by 33 percent in agricultural 
sectors by 2016.  
The second experiment (SIMEDU) focuses on increasing public spending on education 
through a gradual increase from 6.6 percent in 1998 to 9.6 percent in 2010 and after.  This increase in 
public spending is envisioned to raise the long-run TFP level by 19.8 percent for all productive 
sectors by 2016.  
Finally, the third experiment (SIMHEA) introduces an increase in public spending on health 
services from 1.6 percent of GDP in 1998 to 2.6 percent in 2010 and after.  The expected increase in 
public spending on the health sector will raise the long-run TFP level by 21.5 percent for all sectors 
by 2016.   
For all the experiments described above, two schemas are used: 
1.  Additional public expenditures related to each experiment will be financed by an 
endogenous shift in the total public transfers to households (net of direct taxes), henceforth labeled as 
SIMAGR1, SIMEDU1 and SIMHEA1. 
2.  Additional public expenditures related to each experiment are financed by foreign aid, 
henceforth labeled as SIMAGR2, SIMEDU2 and SIMHEA2.     38
Appendix Tables 4A to 8A present the results of the six experiments performed.  
The simulation of a gradual increase in public spending on the agriculture sector suggests that 
the overall impact of this policy should be high but smaller than the expected impact of increasing 
public spending on education or health, as generally reported in the literature.  For all three 
experiments, the expected benefits should be higher when additional public expenditures are financed 
through foreign resources in the form of aid than by reducing direct public transfers (net of direct 
taxes) to households, which may be achieved through an increase of direct taxes or a reduction in 
direct transfers.  
The first policy simulation (SIMAGR1) provides interesting results.  GDP grew by 3.7 
percent per year, compared with 3.2 percent in the baseline scenario.  Given the relatively inelastic 
demand for agricultural commodities, the productivity gains in agriculture tend to reduce the demand 
for labor in agricultural sectors, with surplus labor moving to other sectors.  This explains why this 
reform mostly benefits urban households ─ a gain of 5 percent relative to their disposable income in 
2016 under the baseline scenario, compared with a gain of 2.3 percent for rural households.  
Increasing public expenditures on education (SIMEDU1) provides higher gains in GDP at the 
economy-wide level, with an annual increase of 4.0 percent, compared with 3.2 percent in the 
baseline scenario and 3.7 percent in SIMAGR1, as a result of an increase in production growth in all 
economic sectors by an average yearly rate of 3.6 percent, against only 3.0 percent in the baseline 
scenario and 3.3 percent in the SIMEDU1 scenario.  The effect on household welfare is quite small, 
with less than a 1 percent gain for both rural and urban households, compared with their disposable 
income in 2016 under the baseline scenario.  
This may be explained by the fact that productivity gains tend to reduce the demand for labor 
in all sectors in the first stage, which in turn, affects real wages negatively.  In the second stage, the 
demand for labor increases as a result of output expansion and cost reduction.  The overall result is a 
more rapid decline in unemployment rates for all segments compared with the baseline scenario.  
While the macro-economic effects are more beneficial than in the previous scenario, the effects on 
unemployment rates and poverty levels are less promising.  The high cost of this policy in terms of 
public budget expenditures, which have to be financed through direct transfers from households, 
accounts for its limited impact on poverty.  The net effects, while positive, are less beneficial than 
those in the previous scenario.   39
The results of the last scenario, which relates to a gradual increase in public spending (as a 
share of GDP) on the health sector, are more positive, given the relatively high value of the linkage 
elasticity between output and expenditures on health through the pronounced improvement in TFP.  
The growth rate of GDP goes from 3.2 percent per year in the baseline to 4.3 percent per year in this 
simulation.  The effect on household welfare is impressive with a more than 11 percent increase for 
rural households and almost 17 percent for urban households, compared with their disposable income 
in 2016 under the baseline scenario.  This improvement in both the macroeconomic situation and 
welfare level of all households may be explained by the higher return of public spending on health.  
In fact, in comparison with the increase in public spending on education in the previous simulation, 
this policy greatly improves productivity with fewer public resources (see Appendix Table 8A, which 
provides the costs and benefits for the three public spending experiments with domestic financing).   
While all of the simulation experiments improve the macroeconomic situation of the country 
through higher GDP and export growth rates, the reduction in the poverty rate remains too low and 
the number of poor remains too high.  This is largely because the rate of population growth is so high.  
The poverty rate at the national level, which runs from 41.8 percent in 1998 to 29.2 percent in 2016 in 
the baseline scenario, declines the most in the experiment related to increased public spending on 
health (as reflected by a higher increase of TFP with fewer resources used).  For this public spending 
policy, the poverty rate declines to 20.2 percent where additional foreign aid is the means of financing 
the additional public expenditures (SIMHEA2).  It stands at 21.6 percent in the option where the 
additional public expenditures are financed locally through a shift in direct government transfers to 
households (SIMHEA1).  
Reduction of poverty is much greater in urban than rural areas.  Poverty incidence is 
projected to be only 8.3 percent in urban areas and 9.4 percent in rural areas in 2016, with additional 
public spending (SIMHEA1 or SIMHEA2) compared with 14.3 percent in the baseline scenario.  In 
contrast, the poverty rate in rural areas goes from 29.6 percent in 2016 in the baseline scenario to 30.9 
or 29.4 percent, depending on the source of additional public financing. 
Appendix Table 7A summarizes the results of the first six experiments along with the 
baseline scenario. It shows the changes in the poverty incidence and the number of poor as well as 
changes in the poverty gap index and the severity of poverty.  These indicators are measured at   
national as well as at rural and urban areas.    40
The large estimated effects of additional targeted public spending on health and education, 
rather than agriculture, may be surprising, in light of other studies that have assessed returns to public 
expenditures.  While the results of this study are consistent with some previous studies (Lopez 2004), 
many others report different returns to public spending in selected sectors.  Generally, rate-of-return 
studies have become standard practice in assessing the economic impact of public spending.  The 
reported ex-ante rates of return vary substantially, but in general it is admitted that public spending on 
agriculture, human capital, or infrastructure constitutes a sound investment in poverty reduction and 
economic growth.  
Thus, it is important to understand the variations in estimated rates of return to public 
spending in selected sectors and why they differ across countries and economic tools used.  Taking a 
comprehensive look at all the available evidence on rates of return to public spending, in Yemen, 
results show that spending on health generates the most economic growth and poverty reduction.  For 
the same level of public spending, investment in agriculture generates the second best result.  
However, education seems to be the least promising channel of economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  Comparing the findings of this study with other studies on assessment of public spending 
is undertaken through two main steps.  In the first step, this study is compared with case studies that 
use different economic tools for the assessment.  In the second step, this study is compared with 
studies that use the same assessment tool.  This allows us to draw some conclusions on the robustness 
of these findings in order to prioritize sectoral public spending in Yemen. 
Public spending affects growth and poverty reduction in two ways: first, it can raise the 
overall growth performance of the economy, and second, it can increase the ability of the poor to 
contribute to the growth process.  In a recent paper published by the World Bank Institute, Wilhelm 
and Fiestas (2005) explore the link between spending and pro-poor growth through a review of recent 
analytical work covering several developing countries.  They review recent literature to establish 
which tools are generally used to analyze this link.  Then, based on their findings, they attempt to 
determine the relevant sectors for achieving poverty reduction and economic growth and to 
understand the variation in the levels of return to public spending when the tools used are different.  
From a review of various case studies, they find that investment in agriculture, education, and 
infrastructure, all have a positive effect.  However, investing in agriculture yields the highest returns 
in both growth and poverty reduction, whereas investing in health has a positive effect on poverty 
reduction, but the impact on growth is much weaker.    41
Four main approaches are usually used to assess returns of public spending: (1) benefit 
incidence, (2) labor intensity, (3) regression, and (4) CGE.  Given the different limits addressed by 
the first two approaches and the dominance of the use of the second two, this analysis focuses on case 
studies using either regressions or CGE models.  Benefit incidence analysis has a number of 
shortcomings, according to Bourguignon, da Silva, and Stern (2002).  First, benefit incidence analysis 
cannot be conducted in isolation from a macroeconomic framework.  Second, when applied to public 
expenditures, benefit analysis focuses on the average ex-post incidence of all expenditures at a point 
in time, rather than the marginal ex-ante incidence of a policy, which increases expenditures on a 
service or the coverage of that service or both.  In addition, this kind of analysis gives information on 
the marginal incidence only where the expansion of expenditures improves the quality of the service 
uniformly for all initial users, with absolutely no change in the identity of users, which is a restrictive 
assumption.  A third serious drawback is that standard analysis, or even marginal incidence analysis 
that would simulate the change in the identity of users, assumes no behavioral response from 
recipients of subsidies.  A fourth shortcoming is that incidence analysis needs to be dynamic rather 
than static.  Some of these difficulties have to do again with the lack of reference to a macro-
economic framework.  It may often be irrelevant to consider public spending and fiscal policy 
independently of each other.  This kind of concern should in theory be included in incidence analysis, 
but this requires an interaction with macro-economic modeling.  
For regression studies, mostly household level data are used to link household access to 
infrastructure, technology, and human capital with their per capita income or expenditure, poverty 
status and income distribution (Deninger and Okidi 2003; Nkonya et al 2004).  But as these studies 
have not linked household welfare indicators to government investment at the regional and national 
levels, a second category of regression analysis has emerged, which builds on a conceptual 
framework developed and applied by IFPRI in a number of developing countries around the world.   
The IFPRI list includes many studies such as those carried out by Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 
(1999); Fan and Hazell (2001); Fan and Rao (2003); Fan, Huong, and Long (2004a); Fan, Zhang, and 
Rao (2004b); and Fan, Nyange, and Rao (2005).  Unlike most former studies on government spending 
and investment, the approach developed by Shenggen Fan and others at IFPRI attempts to capture 
synergies across investments by comparing and ranking the returns of various types of investment and 
by calculating the number of poor people raised above the poverty line for additional units of 
expenditure on different items.  At the same time, the IFPRI method evaluates the impact of sectoral 
expenditure on growth and poverty reduction.  The results for Vietnam show, for example, that the 
greatest returns in terms of growth and poverty reduction come from agricultural research and   42
development, followed by investments in telephones and education.  In Uganda, agricultural research 
and development is also the most significant sub-sector, followed by feeder roads and education.  The 
results for India also show that government spending on productivity-enhancing investments 
(especially agricultural research and extension), rural roads, and education targeted directly to the 
rural poor all contribute to reductions in rural poverty and also lead to increased agricultural 
productivity.  
However, there are some slight differences in the relative ranking of expenditures depending 
on whether the primary objective is growth or poverty reduction.  For instance in Uganda, 
investments in roads are not important for growth, but they are significant for poverty reduction 
(fourth place after education).  Similarly, in India, irrigation is the third most important investment in 
terms of growth but has a smaller impact on poverty reduction.  With respect to regions, there is 
significant divergence in all three countries on where governments should allocate their marginal 
resources, depending on whether the priority is poverty reduction or growth.  Accordingly, 
investments in specific sectors such as agriculture, education, and infrastructure appear to be 
important for both growth and poverty reduction, although some trade-offs may exist.   
The main policy recommendation emerging from Fan’s work is that public expenditures 
aimed at reducing rural poverty should focus on improvements in education, agricultural research and 
development, and infrastructure.  Most of the case studies using Fan’s approach show that education 
expenditures positively affect both poverty reduction and growth, whereas health expenditures seem 
to have a positive impact on poverty reduction but may not have the same effect on growth.  Lastly, 
infrastructure spending seems to have a positive impact on both poverty reduction and growth.  
However, these findings vary greatly depending on the specific country context and the 
different specifications of the models being used.  In addition, a number of critical issues emerge 
from the series of studies by Fan and others.  In the first place, the robustness of the results is often 
sensitive to the empirical strategy employed and the countries and time period covered by the sample.  
Another important finding is related to the assumption made that growth is defined as rural income 
growth: the effect of agriculture expenditure on overall growth might not be that significant.  
Furthermore, this kind of analysis does not take into account fiscal policy and how additional 
investments will be financed.  
In some cases, if additional investment is financed through higher income taxes, the effect of 
increasing public spending could differ from the findings of these studies.  Moreover, this kind of   43
analysis ignores the feedback effects that could emerge from higher public spending.  In general, this 
analysis, which takes into account only the first-order effect and ignores the mechanism of public 
financing of additional investments, will generate results different from those drawn from a CGE 
model.  Comparing the robustness of the results of this study with those carried out using regression 
techniques is not very fruitful ─ given the huge differences in model structures and assumptions.  For 
this reason, it seems more relevant to compare the author’s results with similar case studies using 
dynamic CGE models.   
The results of the dynamic CGE model developed by Lofgren and Robinson (2004) for Sub-
Saharan Africa to evaluate the impact that one specific policy has on the economy as a whole may be 
considered as the benchmark for results of this study.  As a regression method, the CGE model 
developed by Lofgren and Robinson allows the ranking of spending priorities depending on the 
primary policy objective.  Their results show that investing in agriculture brings the highest reduction 
growth and poverty levels.  Additionally, investment in human capital (education and health) yields 
higher returns in both growth and poverty reduction than does infrastructure investment.  
Three main reasons explain the difference in ranking between this study and the one done by 
Lofgren and Robinson prioritizing public spending by sector.  First, Lofgren and Robinson’s study 
simulates the effect of a reallocation of government demand to alternative priority areas (agriculture, 
human capital, and infrastructure), while keeping the real growth of total government demand 
constant.  Second, this study analyzes the effects of increasing public spending on alternative 
priorities.  Given that increasing public spending leads to additional resources for the government, the 
additional spending can be financed in two ways: either directly through additional foreign aid, or 
through a shift in public direct transfers to households.  This assumption makes a huge difference in 
the results of this model, given that the additional income generated from higher public spending in 
selected areas might be reduced or exceeded by the losses in public direct transfers to households.  
The third reason is derived from the importance of oil in the Yemeni economy, compared with the 
Sub-Saharan African countries.  More spending on selected sectors will not generate the same level of 
returns at the economy-wide level for a country dominated by oil as it would for a nonoil country.   
Overall, the results of the two approaches (Fan’s and the CGE models) suggest that there are 
no major differences when ranking expenditures.  However, within the CGE models, results may 
differ based on the values of the key parameters as well as the assumption regarding the way public 
investment is financed: through a reallocation across sectors or through additional investment.  The   44
dynamic as well as the second-order effects may also help explain the differences in estimated rates 
of return to public spending.
10  
In addition, from reviewing country studies that assess the link between public spending, 
poverty reduction and growth, it is also clear that expenditure priorities are highly country-specific. 
Thus, outcomes of a specific country study cannot be duplicated for other countries, given the large 
variation in initial country conditions, the complex chain of linkages, the time lags involved and the 
interdependence among development outcomes, in addition to differences in the structure and features 
of the tools (Paternostro, Rajaram, and Tiongson 2005). 
The above findings highlight the importance and need for rigorous country specific analysis 
of public resource allocations across and within sectors, which could help to evaluate the marginal 
returns on different types of government spending.  However, each of the four tools has severe 
limitations and rather than using one approach, it may be useful to draw from various tools and 
techniques to get a more comprehensive view on the potential return of alternative allocations of 
public resources.  
Therefore, to provide a better understanding of the impact of public investment across 
sectors, it may be useful to use a combination of different approaches.  This may allow more solid 
evidence on the potential return of alternative combinations of public resources to be derived and may 
be a way to address some of the limitations associated with the different models and techniques.  This 
approach was used in the work of Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) who tried to construct a 
"pro-poor expenditure index".  Using four different methods ─ benefit incidence, labor intensity, 
regression, and CGE ─they attempt to establish in which sectors the expansion of expenditures is 
likely to be poverty reducing (Wilhelm and Fiestas 2005).  More recently, Fan et al. (2006) applied 
both approaches (regressions and CGE model) to assess the effects of public spending on poverty in 
Egypt (regressions and CGE model). 
Given the difficulty of estimating econometrically the different parameters used for 
calibrating a CGE model, it may be argued that differences in the ranking of public spending in 
selected areas may be explained by differences in the values of the various parameters or the structure 
of both of the models used.  However, given the specific structure of the Yemeni economy compared 
                                                 
10 Data availability for the India study goes back to 1970, so time lags are empirically taken into account. 
However, in Vietnam and Uganda, the lack of long-term time series data on regional public expenditures and 
other indicators, such as infrastructure, does not allow this (Wilhelm and Fiestas 2005). 
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with the other countries analyzed by Lofgren and Robinson (2004) or Fan et al. (2006), improvements 
in productivity as a result of increasing public spending in health and education should take into 
account the importance of the oil sector in the Yemeni economy.  
Accordingly, two additional simulations (SIMEDU-NOIL and SIMHEA-NOIL) are 
undertaken on increasing public spending in the education and health sectors.  Contrary to the 
previous simulations, both new scenarios assume that the additional public spending will not improve 
the productivity of the oil sector in Yemen because the oil sector is a capital-intensive sector, and its 
productivity is not closely linked to human capital, as it is in sectors that are labor-intensive or not 
tradable.  The results of the two simulations are presented in Appendix Tables 4A to 7A.  
Appendix Table 8A shows the marginal returns of public spending in the three sectors: 
agriculture, health, and education for all simulations.  Results show that when the improvement in 
TFP does not cover the oil sector, the same level of public spending in the agricultural sector 
generates higher returns both in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction.  In addition, the 
two additional simulations increase the level of poverty in the country given that the cost of this 
policy, which is financed through higher taxes (less subsidies) on households, exceeds the level of 
returns in terms of welfare for both household categories included in the study.  Accordingly, the 
main difference in prioritizing public spending between this analysis and the others performed by 
Lofgren and Robinson and Fan et al. may be explained by the importance of the oil sector in the 
Yemeni economy.   46
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has provided evidence suggesting that the structure of public spending is an 
important factor of economic growth and poverty reduction.  Preliminary simulations show that 
increasing public spending in health and agriculture could benefit the country more than spending 
focused only on the education sector.  Accordingly, the results of these experiments show that public 
spending targeted more toward improving health and education services generates more economic 
growth and thereby reduces the poverty level.  However, because public spending in health and 
education sectors does not improve productivity in the oil sector, spending on agriculture 
infrastructure generates the higher return in both economic growth and poverty reduction.  
In any case, the road still appears to be long for Yemen to be able to achieve its MDG in 
terms of poverty reduction.  Re-allocating public expenditures from defense to these key sectors for 
example, seems to be the best option to reduce poverty, given the financial constraints facing Yemen.  
However, in the current context of terrorism concerns, it will be very difficult to convince policy-
makers to reduce spending on defense and security.  Targeting additional resources from international 
donors seems to be the only option available to increase public spending in the key sectors, given that 
Yemen’s level of crude oil exports is declining and is expected to do so for the next decade.   47
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Appendix: Supplementary Tables 
Table 1A.  Aggregate and sectoral growth in GDP 
   1990 1991 1992  1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Real GDP (Annual Growth Rate)  ..   2.0     8.3   4.1   2.2 11.6    6.0   8.0   6.5   2.7 6.5 4.7 3.6
Real Oil GDP (Annual Growth Rate)  .. −5.7 −15.9   4.3 43.7 20.0  13.0   5.0   3.0 10.0 0.0 .. ..
Real GDP per capita (Annual Growth 
Rate) .. −9.7     4.9   0.7 −1.1   8.6    3.1   5.0   3.5 −0.1 3.6 1.6 0.5
Real GDP PPP per capita (Growth Rate)  .. −8.6   10.8   1.9   5.5   7.5    0.5   2.3 −2.8   3.7 5.7 0.5 0.9
GDP Agriculture (% of Total Real GDP)  24.2 21.3   23.0 21.4 22.6 20.0  16.9 16.3 20.3 16.7 14.1 15.3 15.2
GDP Agriculture (Annual Growth Rate)  .. −7.4   19.1   4.4 −3.4   9.6    2.6   8.1 14.0   1.2 4.6 5.9 3.6
GDP Industry (% of Total Real GDP)  26.8 24.5   22.7 21.8  24.0 32.0  41.5 43.2 32.5 42.0 47.3 42.2 40.4
GDP Industry (Annual Growth Rate)  .. −0.2   −3.9   4.5  13.1 21.2  10.5   7.6   2.7   4.8 -1.8 2.5 1.7
GDP Services (% of Total Real GDP)  49.0 54.2   54.3 56.8  53.4 48.0  41.6 40.5 47.2 41.4 38.6 42.5 44.4
GDP Services (Annual Growth Rate)  ..   7.8     9.9   3.7 −0.2   7.7  51.0   8.1   5.4   2.3 12.4 5.3 4.5
Source: World Bank  (2004), Al-Asaly (2003) and author's calculations   51
Table 2A.  Macroeconomics indicators 
   1990  1991  1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000  2001  2002 
Final  Expenditures,  Saving  and  Investment                        
Final  Consumption  Expenditures  (Share  of    GDP)  91.2  105.7  106.6 117.2 86.4  85.4  83.9  84.0 88.4 78.4  75.1 81.8 84.0 
Final Consumption Expenditures (Annual  Growth Rate)  ..  21.6  6.1  14.5  −24.7  10.4    4.1  8.1  12.1  -8.9  2.0  14.1  6.3 
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
(Share of GDP)   17.5  19.1  19.4 19.1 18.8  14.4 13.1 13.0  14.5  13.4 12.7  13.6  13.9 
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
(Annual  Growth Rate)   ..  14.5  6.8  2.6  0.6  −14.7  −3.1 7.2 18.5  -4.8 0.7 12.3  6.1 
Household Final Consumption Expenditure, Etc. (Share of 
GDP)   73.8  86.6  87.2  98.2  67.6  71.1  70.8  71.0 73.9 65.0  62.4 68.2 70.0 
Household Final Consumption Expenditure, Etc. (Annual 
Growth Rate)   .. 23.3  −2.7 15.3 −9.6 18.7  −7.5 5.3 10.9  -9.7 2.1 14.8  4.6 
Gross National Saving (Share of GDP)  8.8  −5.7  −6.6  −17.2 13.6  14.6  16.1  16.0 11.6 21.6  24.9 18.2 16.0 
Gross National Saving (Annual Growth Rate)    −177.8 47.3  224.0 −201.2  80.3 59.4 19.9  -30.7  152.5  51.4  -22.9  -4.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Share of GDP)   11.9  13.9  19.9  17.5  19.0  20.6  21.3  21.4  31.2  22.8  16.5  16.4  15.8 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Annual Growth Rate)   ..  −4.3 92.3  −8.5 11.2  21.0 9.5  8.4 55.5  -24.9  -22.8  3.9 0.0 
Inflation  Rate  (GDP  Deflator,  %)  ..  17.1  17.4 19.2 25.8  50.7 35.9 11.8  -10.1  31.9 22.9  1.0 5.2 
External Sector                                 
Exports  (Share  of  GDP)  14.3  13.7  21.5 27.4 51.2  50.7 42.3 35.8  26.6  35.6 42.6  37.1  37.9 
Exports (Annual Growth Rate)  ..  −1.8  69.1 33.0 90.9  10.5 −11.7  -8.6 -20.9  37.8 27.3 -8.8 5.9 
Imports  (Share  of  GDP)  20.1  35.6  50.5 64.9 58.7  58.0 49.2 44.5  47.2  38.0 35.0  36.1  38.6 
Imports (Annual Growth Rate)  ..  80.7  53.7  33.8  −7.7 10.4  −10.2  -2.4 13.1 -17.2 -2.0 8.1  10.5 
Current Account (Share of GDP)  15.3  −13.0  −18.8  −25.5  6.6  4.3 1.8 0.3  -5.0  7.4 14.2  7.0  5.4 
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)   −2.7  5.6  12.5 18.4 0.4  −5.1  −1.0 -2.0 -3.5 -4.1  0.1  1.6  1.1 
Trade  (%  of  GDP)    34.4  49.3  71.9  92.3  109.9  108.8 91.4  80.2 73.8 73.7  77.6 73.2 76.5 
External Balance on Goods and Services (Share of GDP)  −5.8  −21.8  −29.0  −37.5  −7.4  −7.3  −6.9  -8.7  -20.6  -2.4 7.6 0.9 -0.6 
Source: World Bank (2004) and author's calculations  
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Table 3A.  Yemeni macro social accounting matrix, 1998  (YR million)  








Tariffs Rest  of 
World 
Total 
Activities    1247249.2              1475269.5 
Commodities  734646.2     592491  45396    310946.7    228020.3  1683479.9 
Factors  714407.6       96751          
Households      625559.4   18680          154869.9 799109.3 
Government      117772    26215.7  54441.1    31036.3  48165.4  277630.5 
Indirect  
Taxes Net of 
Subsidies 




     54441.1           54441.1 
Savings-
Investment 
      152177.2 116803.5         41966  310946.7 
Tariffs     31036.3              31036.3 
Rest of  
World 
  405194.4  67827.2              473021.6 
  Total  1475269.5  1683479.9 811158.6  799109.3 277630.5 26215.7  54441.1  310946.7  31036.3  473021.6   
Source:  Author's estimations. 
N.B.  Data are rounded to one decimal point. 
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Table 4A.  Macroeconomic results 
















Real Gross Domestic 
Product  
  3.2  3.7   3.7    4    4.3    4.3    4.4    3.3  3.7 
Total Production     3  3.3   3.3    3.6    3 9    3.9    4    3  3.4 
Private Consumption    2.7  2.9   3    2.7    3.5    3.4    3.6    2.7  3.4 
Real Urban Available 
Income 
  5  5.3   5.4    5.1    6.2    6    6.2    5  5.9 
Real Rural Available 
Income 
  1.4  1.6   1.6    1.5    2.2    2.1    2.3    1.4  2 
Investment    0.6   0.8   0.9    0.5    1    0.9    1  −1.1  -0.5 
Exports    2.1    2.9    2.9    2.8    3.4    3.3    3.5    1.9  2.5 
Imports     1.3    .8    1.8    1.7    2.1    2.1    2.2    1.2  1.6 
Government revenue  −1  −0.6  −1    0.7  −1.3  −0.7  −1.3  −1.4  -3.6 
GDP deflator    −0.9  −0.7  −0.7  −1  −0.9  −0.9  −0.9  −1  -1 
Source:  Model’s results 
N.B.  Macroeconomic aggregates are expressed in annual percentage changes during the period 1998-2016 compared to 1998.   
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Table 5A.  Changes in real wages by segment and simulation 
















Rural unskilled workers in the public 
sector  
−5.8  −5.8  −5.8  −6  −6.1  −6.1  −6.1  -5.8 -5.9 
Rural skilled workers in the public 
sector  
−5.8  −5.8  −5.8  −6  −6.1  −6.1  −6.1  -5.8 -5.9 
Rural unskilled workers in the 
private sector 
−1.1    0.7    0.6  −0.6  −0.3  −0.3  −0.2  -1.3 -0.9 
Rural skilled workers in the private 
sector 
−2.8  −2.6  −2.6  −2.2  −2.5  −2.4  −2.5  -2.7 -2.8 
Urban unskilled workers in the 
public sector 
−5.8  −5.8  −5.8  −6  −6.1  −6.1  −6.1  -5.8 -5.9 
Urban skilled workers in the public 
sector  
−5.8  −5.8  −5.8  −6  −6.1  −6.1  −6.1  -5.8 -5.9 
Urban unskilled workers in the 
private sector 
−1.3  −0.2  −0.2  −0.9  −0.7  −0.7  −0.6  -1.5 -1.3 
Urban skilled workers in the private 
sector 
−3  −2.9  −2.9  −2.6  −2.8  −2.7  −2.8  -3.1 -3.2 
Notes: Real wages are expressed in percentage changes compared to the base year.  
Table 6A.  Trend in unemployment rates by skill and areas and simulation 
















Rural Unskilled        0  0.2  0.2  −0.4  −0.4  −0.5  −0.5    0.3   0.3 
Rural Skilled    −6.9  −10.7  −9.2  −9  −13.7  −29.5  −14.5  −5.5  -4.1 
Urban 
Unskilled  
−0.3  −0.8  −0.7  −0.6  −0.7  −0.7  −0.8    0.2   0.2 
Urban Skilled    −1.9  −2.5  −2.3  −3.2  −2.6  −2.9  −2.7  −1  -0.7 
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Poverty  Incidence  (P0)           
        National  Level  41.8 23  26.2 25.3 27.4 20.8 21.6 20.3 23.9 24.3 
    Urban Areas  30.8  14.3  12.8  12  14.8  8.6  9.4  8.3  15.2  12.1 
    Rural Areas   45  29.6  36.4  35.5  37  30  30.9  29.4  30.6  33.5 
Poverty  Gap  Index  (P1)           
        National  Level  13.2 13.2 13.8 13.6 14  12.7 12.9 12.7 13.1 12.8 
        Urban  Areas  14.7 15.2 14.9 14.8 15.2 14.3 14.4 14.2 14.7 14.2 
        Rural  Areas  8.2 8  8.6 8.5 8.6 8  8.1 8  8.1 8.1 
Severity  of  Poverty(P2)           
        National  Level  5.8 5.7 6.5 6.3 6.8 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.7 5.6 
        Urban  Areas  6.7 7.3 7  6.8 7.4 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.7 6.5 
        Rural  Areas  3.2 2.9 3.7 3.7 3.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.1 
Notes:  P1, P2, and P3 are expressed in percentages at the end of the simulation period (2016).  Data are rounded to one decimal.  











GDP  0.056 0.0365  0.1  0.004  0.046 
Poverty Incidence Changes           
National  Level  0.336  0.082 0.693 0.039  0.119 
Urban Areas  (0.168  0.022  (0.447  0.039  0.201 
Rural Areas  0.761  0.32  0.119  0.043  0.356 
Source:  Author’s calculations 
Note: For every 100 billion YR spent during the simulation period, the annual percentage change is given, compared with the 
 baseline scenario. 
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